To implement the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) security in OMNeT++ has involves mimicking the components of a SCADA system, containing controllers, actuators, the central SCADA server, and sensors. Security mechanisms like encryption, intrusion detection systems (IDS), access controls and firewalls are integrated into the simulation to defend the SCADA system from cyber threats. Given procedure will guide on how to implement SCADA security in OMNeT++.
Step-by-Step Implementations:
Initially, we describe a network topology that contains SCADA components like a master terminal unit (MTU), the central SCADA server, sensors, actuators, and remote terminal units (RTUs). This topology will help as the foundation for executing security measures.
network SCADANetwork
{
submodules:
sensor1: StandardHost {
@display(“p=100,100”);
}
sensor2: StandardHost {
@display(“p=100,200”);
}
actuator1: StandardHost {
@display(“p=300,100”);
}
actuator2: StandardHost {
@display(“p=300,200”);
}
rtu: StandardHost {
@display(“p=500,150”);
}
firewall: FirewallModule {
@display(“p=400,150”);
}
ids: IDSModule {
@display(“p=600,150”);
}
mtu: StandardHost {
@display(“p=700,150”);
}
scadaServer: SecureSCADAServerModule {
@display(“p=800,150”);
}
connections:
sensor1.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> firewall.in++;
sensor2.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> firewall.in++;
firewall.out++ <–> rtu.ethg++;
rtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> ids.in++;
ids.out++ <–> mtu.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> actuator1.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> actuator2.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> scadaServer.ethg++;
}
The firewall module will strain traffic among the SCADA server, actuators, sensors, actuators, and RTUs, make sure only authentic communications are permitted.
Firewall Module
// FirewallModule.cc
#include <omnetpp.h>
#include “inet/common/INETDefs.h”
#include “inet/common/packet/Packet.h”
#include “inet/networklayer/ipv4/Ipv4Header_m.h”
using namespace omnetpp;
using namespace inet;
class FirewallModule : public cSimpleModule
{
protected:
virtual void initialize() override;
virtual void handleMessage(cMessage *msg) override;
bool isAllowed(Packet *packet);
};
Define_Module(FirewallModule);
void FirewallModule::initialize()
{
EV << “Firewall Module Initialized” << endl;
}
void FirewallModule::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (Packet *packet = dynamic_cast<Packet *>(msg)) {
if (isAllowed(packet)) {
send(packet, “out”);
} else {
EV << “Packet dropped by firewall.” << endl;
delete packet;
}
}
}
bool FirewallModule::isAllowed(Packet *packet)
{
const auto& networkHeader = packet->peekAtFront<Ipv4Header>();
std::string source = networkHeader->getSrcAddress().str();
std::string destination = networkHeader->getDestAddress().str();
// Example: Allow only specific sensor-to-RTU and RTU-to-MTU communications
if ((source == “192.168.1.10” && destination == “192.168.1.50”) ||
(source == “192.168.1.50” && destination == “192.168.1.70”)) {
return true; // Allow traffic
}
return false; // Block all other traffic
}
The IDS module will observe network traffic for suspicious activities, particularly vital for detecting cyber-attacks aiming the SCADA system.
IDS Module
// IDSModule.cc
#include <omnetpp.h>
#include “inet/common/INETDefs.h”
#include “inet/common/packet/Packet.h”
#include “inet/networklayer/ipv4/Ipv4Header_m.h”
using namespace omnetpp;
using namespace inet;
class IDSModule : public cSimpleModule
{
protected:
virtual void initialize() override;
virtual void handleMessage(cMessage *msg) override;
void detectIntrusion(Packet *packet);
void logSecurityEvent(const std::string &event);
};
Define_Module(IDSModule);
void IDSModule::initialize()
{
EV << “IDS Module Initialized” << endl;
}
void IDSModule::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (Packet *packet = dynamic_cast<Packet *>(msg)) {
detectIntrusion(packet);
send(msg, “out”);
}
}
void IDSModule::detectIntrusion(Packet *packet)
{
const auto& networkHeader = packet->peekAtFront<Ipv4Header>();
std::string source = networkHeader->getSrcAddress().str();
std::string destination = networkHeader->getDestAddress().str();
// Example: Detect unauthorized access or abnormal traffic
if (source == “192.168.1.100” || destination == “192.168.1.100”) {
logSecurityEvent(“Suspicious activity detected from ” + source + ” to ” + destination);
}
}
void IDSModule::logSecurityEvent(const std::string &event)
{
EV << “IDS Event: ” << event << endl;
// Additional logging to files or alerts can be implemented here
}
The SCADA server should use safe communication protocols to interact with RTUs and MTUs, make sure the integrity and privacy of commands and data.
Secure SCADA Server Module
// SecureSCADAServerModule.cc
#include <omnetpp.h>
#include “inet/common/INETDefs.h”
#include “inet/common/packet/Packet.h”
#include <string>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
using namespace omnetpp;
using namespace inet;
class SecureSCADAServerModule : public cSimpleModule
{
protected:
virtual void initialize() override;
virtual void handleMessage(cMessage *msg) override;
std::string encryptData(const std::string &data);
std::string decryptData(const std::string &data);
void processSecureCommand(Packet *packet);
};
Define_Module(SecureSCADAServerModule);
void SecureSCADAServerModule::initialize()
{
EV << “Secure SCADA Server Initialized” << endl;
}
void SecureSCADAServerModule::handleMessage(cMessage *msg)
{
if (Packet *packet = dynamic_cast<Packet *>(msg)) {
const auto& payload = packet->peekData();
std::string data(payload->str());
std::string decryptedData = decryptData(data);
EV << “Data decrypted: ” << decryptedData << endl;
processSecureCommand(packet);
}
}
std::string SecureSCADAServerModule::encryptData(const std::string &data)
{
unsigned char key[16] = “scadakey12345678”;
unsigned char iv[16] = “initialvector12”;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
unsigned char encrypted[1024];
int len;
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encrypted, &len, (unsigned char*)data.c_str(), data.length());
int ciphertext_len = len;
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, encrypted + len, &len);
ciphertext_len += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return std::string((char*)encrypted, ciphertext_len);
}
std::string SecureSCADAServerModule::decryptData(const std::string &data)
{
unsigned char key[16] = “scadakey12345678”;
unsigned char iv[16] = “initialvector12”;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
unsigned char decrypted[1024];
int len;
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, decrypted, &len, (unsigned char*)data.c_str(), data.length());
int plaintext_len = len;
EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, decrypted + len, &len);
plaintext_len += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return std::string((char*)decrypted, plaintext_len);
}
void SecureSCADAServerModule::processSecureCommand(Packet *packet)
{
// Process the command securely (e.g., control a physical process)
EV << “Secure command processed: ” << packet->str() << endl;
}
Mimic potential SCADA-specific cyber-attacks like passing malicious commands to RTUs, spoofing sensor data, or testing to take control of the system.
SCADA Attack Simulation Module
// SCADAAttackModule.cc
#include <omnetpp.h>
#include “inet/applications/tcpapp/TcpAppBase.h”
using namespace omnetpp;
using namespace inet;
class SCADAAttackModule : public TcpAppBase
{
protected:
virtual void initialize(int stage) override;
virtual void handleMessageWhenUp(cMessage *msg) override;
void simulateMaliciousCommand();
void simulateSensorDataSpoofing();
};
Define_Module(SCADAAttackModule);
void SCADAAttackModule::initialize(int stage)
{
TcpAppBase::initialize(stage);
if (stage == inet::INITSTAGE_APPLICATION_LAYER) {
scheduleAt(simTime() + 3, new cMessage(“simulateMaliciousCommand”));
scheduleAt(simTime() + 5, new cMessage(“simulateSensorDataSpoofing”));
}
}
void SCADAAttackModule::handleMessageWhenUp(cMessage *msg)
{
if (strcmp(msg->getName(), “simulateMaliciousCommand”) == 0) {
simulateMaliciousCommand();
delete msg;
} else if (strcmp(msg->getName(), “simulateSensorDataSpoofing”) == 0) {
simulateSensorDataSpoofing();
delete msg;
} else {
TcpAppBase::handleMessageWhenUp(msg);
}
}
void SCADAAttackModule::simulateMaliciousCommand()
{
EV << “Simulating malicious command to RTU…” << endl;
sendRequest(“POST /control HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: rtu\r\n\r\nCommand=shutdown”);
}
void SCADAAttackModule::simulateSensorDataSpoofing()
{
EV << “Simulating sensor data spoofing…” << endl;
sendRequest(“GET /sensor_data HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: mtu\r\n\r\nFake sensor data”);
}
Incorporate the attack simulation modules, secure SCADA server, firewall, and IDS into the network to make a complete SCADA security simulation.
network SCADANetwork
{
submodules:
sensor1: StandardHost {
@display(“p=100,100”);
}
sensor2: StandardHost {
@display(“p=100,200”);
}
actuator1: StandardHost {
@display(“p=300,100”);
}
actuator2: StandardHost {
@display(“p=300,200”);
}
rtu: StandardHost {
@display(“p=500,150”);
}
firewall: FirewallModule {
@display(“p=400,150”);
}
ids: IDSModule {
@display(“p=600,150”);
}
mtu: StandardHost {
@display(“p=700,150”);
}
scadaServer: SecureSCADAServerModule {
@display(“p=800,150”);
}
attacker: SCADAAttackModule {
@display(“p=100,300”);
}
connections:
sensor1.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> firewall.in++;
sensor2.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> firewall.in++;
firewall.out++ <–> rtu.ethg++;
rtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> ids.in++;
ids.out++ <–> mtu.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> actuator1.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> actuator2.ethg++;
mtu.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> scadaServer.ethg++;
attacker.ethg++ <–> Eth100M <–> firewall.in++;
}
Compile and run the simulation in OMNeT++. The IDS should detect abnormal behaviours, the SCADA server should process commands securely, and the firewall should block unauthorized traffic.
Verify the OMNeT++ simulation log to see how the SCADA system reacted to several simulated attacks. Check that:
We can expand this setup by:
In this page, we had executed complete approaches to perform the SCADA security in OMNeT++ tool. We will present further details as per your needs. omnet-manual.com provides excellent guidance on simulating SCADA Security within the OMNeT++ tool. You can contact the omnet-manual.com team for prompt assistance in understanding your network performance.